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THE (LACK OF) ENFORCEMENT OF
PROSECUTOR DISCLOSURE RULES
Kevin C. McMunigal*
I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal defense lawyers and academics have long complained of
failures by prosecutors to honor their constitutional and ethical
obligations to disclose exculpatory information. In recent years, such
prosecutorial failures have gained the attention of a broad audience. The
advent of DNA evidence has revealed and continues to reveal wrongful
convictions around the country. These exonerations and the
investigations that accompanied them have shown that failures by
prosecutors and police to disclose exculpatory information have
repeatedly contributed to wrongful convictions.' In 2007, a national
spotlight shone on North Carolina prosecutor Michael Nifong's failure
to reveal that DNA testing exonerated players charged in the Duke
Lacrosse team case.' In 2009, the national press gave front page
treatment to another prosecutorial failure to disclose exculpatory
information when Judge Emmet G. Sullivan dismissed the public
corruption case against Alaska Senator Ted Stevens due to Department
of Justice prosecutors' failure to make required disclosures.' In addition
to dismissing the charges, Judge Sullivan appointed a special prosecutor
to investigate the prosecutors' disclosure violations" In a front page
story in The New York Times, Neil Lewis described Judge Sullivan as
delivering "a broad warning about what he said was a 'troubling
* Judge Ben C. Green Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
I. See JrM DWYER er AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FJVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 90-92,101 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Prosecutor Becomes Prosecuted, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2007, § 4,
at 4; Duff Wilson, Hearing Ends in Disbarment/or Prosecutor in Duke Case, N.Y. TiMES, June 17,
2007, at A21.
3. Neil A. Lewis, Tables Turned On Prosecution in Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009,
at Ai.
4. ld.
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tendency' he had observed among prosecutors to stretch the boundaries
of ethics restrictions and conceal evidence to win cases."
Even more recently, prosecutorial failures to disclose exculpatory
information have continued to draw both national and international
attention. In the federal manslaughter prosecution of five Blackwater
employees for shooting civilians at a public square in Bagdad, Iraq,
Judge Ricardo M. Urbina dismissed the charges due to prosecutorial
misconduct.6 Although the primary focus of his lengthy opinion was
improper use of statements made by the defendants, Judge Urbina also
criticized the prosecutors for a variety of disclosure failures. J On March
2, 2010, an article on the first page of the National Section of The New
York Times described prosecutorial failure in a Louisiana capital murder
case to disclose a videotaped interview of the state's key eyewitness
contradictingher trial testimony on several important points. 8
In this Article, I assess the apparent prospects for increased
disciplinary enforcement of state ethics rules based on Rule 3.8(d) of the
American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model Rules of Professional
Conduct that mandates prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory
information. In particular, I focus on whether it makes sense to view
recent ABA Formal Opinion 09-454; in which the ABA gave an
expansive reading to Model Rule 3.8(d), as the bellwether of an era of
increased enforcement of ethical disclosure rules for prosecutors.
II. DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT
Criminal defense and civil rights lawyers along with legal scholars
have complained for decades that the bar fails to adequately discipline
prosecutors. In public debates about prosecutorial immunity, for
example, those hostile to immunity point out that it undermines specific
and general deterrence of prosecutorial wrongdoing.'? Proponents of
prosecutorial immunity counter this concern about inadequate deterrence
by arguing that the threat of ethical disciplinary sanctions fills the
deterrence gap created by immunity. II Critics of immunity respond by
5. ld.
6. Del Quentin Wilber, Charges Against 5 Blackwater Guards Dismissed, WASH. POST, Jan.
1,2010, at A!.
7. United States v. Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 112, 118-19, 122~26 (D.D.C. 2009).
8. Campbell Robertson, New Evidence Surfaces in New Orleans Killings, N.Y. TLMES, Mar.
2.2010, at A12.
9. ABA Comrn. on Ethics and Prof] Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009) [hereinafter
Formal Op.].
10. Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecu(oriallmmunity 2005 BYU L. REv.
53,141,146-47 (2005). '
II. Id. at 58-60.
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arguing that ethics rules against prosecutors across the country are
dramatically under-enforced. 12
Pottawattamie County v. Harrington," a civil rights immunity case
recently before the U.S. Supreme Court, supports the critics' under-
enforcement argument. 14 The plaintiffs in the case, two African-
American men, were convicted of murder based primarily on the
testimony of a sixteen-year-old cooperating witness. 15 The Iowa
Supreme Court found that the prosecutors had violated their disclosure
duty under Brady v. Maryland'? and overturned the convictions." The
convicted men then brought a civil rights action alleging that the
prosecutors in the case had fabricated evidence by coercing and
coaching the cooperating witness, who later recanted. I' The key issue
before the Supreme Court was the scope of prosecutorial immunity. 19
The plaintiffs supported their argument against application of
prosecutorial immunity by pointing out that ethics authorities had never
even investigated, much less disciplined, the prosecutors in the case,
despite the fact that the Iowa Supreme Court had found that the
prosecutors had violated their constitutional Brady disclosure
obllgauons."
Bennett Gershman, a professor and former prosecutor, has written
in his treatise on prosecutorial misconduct that "[aJ prosecutor's
violation of the obligation to disclose favorable evidence accounts for
more miscarriages of justice than any other type of malpractice, but is
rarely sanctioned by the courts, and almost never by disciplinary
bodies."" What empirical support exists for such complaints of lack of
enforcement of ethics disclosure rules against prosecutors? To answer
this question, Professor Richard Rosen conducted a broad search of
available printed sources such as reported opinions, books, and
12. fd.at60,65.
13. 547 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2002 (2009), and cat. dismissed,
130, S. Ct. 1047 (2010).
14. Id. at 933. The Supreme Court dismissed the case on January 4, 2010, and the lawyers
announced that the parties had arrived at a $l2 million settlement. Bobby G. Frederick,
Pouawanamie County Case Settled for Sl2 Million, S.C. CRIM. DEF. BLOG (Jan. 5, 2010),
http://www.southcarolinacriminaldefenseblog.com!2010/01/pottawattamie_county-case_setl.html.
15. Harrington, 547 F.3d at 926-27; see Brief of Black Cops Against Police Brutality as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5, 36, Porrawattamie County v. Harrington, 129 S. Ct.
2002 (2009)(No. 08-1065).
16. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
17. Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 522-23, 525 (Iowa 2003).
18. fd.at512,516-17.
19. !d. at 521-25.
20. Brief for Respondents at 56, Pottawattamie County v. Harrington, 129 S. Ct. 2002 (2009)
(No. 08-1065).
21. BENNETTL. GERSHMAN, PROSEClITORlALMISCONDUCT,at v, ix (2d ed. 2006).
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articles.22 In addition, he surveyed lawyer disciplinary bodies throughout
the United States.'] Professor Rosen published the results in a 1987 law
review article" and conclnded that "despite numerous reported cases
showing violations of [disclosure] rules, disciplinary charges have been
brought infrequently and meaningful sanctions rarely applied.""
Has the level of enforcement of ethical disclosure rules for
prosecutors changed since 19877 The evidence on this question is
mixed. There are encouraging signs suggesting that enforcement
attitudes regarding prosecutorial disclosure violations may be changing.
But there continue to be discouraging signs as well, that resistance to
enforcing ethical disclosure rules against prosecutors remains a problem.
A. Signs a/Change
I. ABA Formal Opinion 09-454
The ABA recently sent an encouraging signal about enforcement of
ethics disclosure mles against prosecutors. In July 2009, the ABA's
Standing Committee On Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued
Formal Opinion 09-454, providing guidance on the scope of the ethical
disclosure obligation imposed on prosecutors by Model Rule 3.8(d).26
Model Rule 3.8(d) states that the prosecutor in a criminal case
shall:
[M]ake timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to
the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information
known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this
responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.v'
Although the Model Rules have included Rule 3.8(d) since their
creation in 1983,28 and the predecessor to the Model Rules, the 1969
22. Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 693, 700-01 & nn.38-42 (1987).
23. See generallyid
24. [d. at 693.
25. ld. at 697; see also id. at 697~703, 720-31 (noting cases that considered disciplinary
action).
26. Formal Op., supra note 9, at 1-8 (discussing the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence
and information favorable to the defense).
27. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2007).
28. CTR. FOR PROF'l RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS'N, THE. LEGiSLATIVE HISTORY OF THE.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 140-43 (1987).
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ABA Model Code, included a similar provision," very few judicial or
state or local ethics opinions over that forty-year period have interpreted
state analogs to Rule 3.8(d). For example, in 2005 the Louisiana
Supreme Court slated that it had never before had occasion to consider
its version of Rule 3.8(d).30
ABA Formal Opinion 09-454 is, without question, a promising step
toward more robust enforcement of the prosecutor's ethical disclosure
duties. It clarifies the differences between the ethical disclosure duty and
the constitutional disclosure duty," a point on which many prosecutors,
ethics authorities, and courts continue to be confused. It also
reemphasizes the importance of prosecutorial disclosure in our criminal
justice system." This clarification and emphasis should help both to
educate prosecutors about their disclosure obligations and to encourage
ethics authorities to enforce those obligations. Since almost every
jurisdiction has adopted the language of Model Rule 3.8(d), JJ this
opinion should have considerable influence as highly persuasive
authority on a prosecutor's ethical disclosure duty.
The ABA Standing Committee in Opinion 09-454 thoroughly
examined the relationship between Rule 3.8(d) and the prosecutor's
constitutional obligation under Brady.'4 The Committee explained that
the ethical duty under Model Rule 3.8(d) is separate from, and more
expansive than, the constitutional disclosure obligation in several
significant ways.
a. Materiality
A key feature of current Brady doctrine is its materiality
requirement. Under the Brady line of cases, a prosecutor need only
disclose exculpatory evidence if it is material, meaning that it would
likely affect the outcome of the case. J5
The text of Model Rule 3.8(d) contains no such materiality
limitation. Accordingly, Opinion 09-454 states that Rule 3.8(d) requires
a prosecutor to inform the accused of all known information favorable to
29. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBIUIT DR 7-l03(8) (1980); see also Formal Op.,
supra note 9, at 3 (discussing the 1969 adoption of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility).
30. In re Jordan, 913 So. 2d 775, 781 (La. 2005) ("This is a case of first impression in the
State of Louisiana. Never before have we been confronted with the issue of disciplining a
prosecutor for failing to disclose 'evidence or information' ... [under the Rules of Professional
Conduct].").
31. Formal Op., supra note 9, at 1-5.
32. See id. at I.
33. See Rosen, supra note 22, at 715'-l6 & nn.118-22.
34. Formal Gp.,supra note 9, at 1-5.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 698-700 (1985).
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the defendant even if the prosecutor does not believe that the
information would affect the outcome of the case at tria1.'" According to
the opinion, while the ethical "obligation may overlap with a
prosecutor's other legal obligations" it is more expansive and requires
the prosecutor to turn over information even if the prosecutor believes
that it "has only a minimal tendency to negate the defendant's guilt, or
that the favorable evidence is highly unreliable.":"
b. Evidence and Information
Model Rule 3.8(d) requires the prosecutor to disclose "all evidence
or information" that is exculpatory." As this language makes clear, the
ethical duty is not limited to admissible evidence, The ABA points out in
Opinion 09-454 that Model Rule 3,8(d) requires disclosure of
"information" that may be inadmissible but which "may lead a
defendant's lawyer to admissible testimony or other evidence or assist
him in other ways, such as in plea ncgotiations.r"
c. Timing
Opinion 09-454 also addresses the timing of disclosure, The text of
Model Rule 3.8(d) requires "timely disclosure.v'" Opinion 09-454
explains that disclosure must be made early enough so that defense
counsel may use the evidence and information effectively." I Reasoning
that defense counsel can use favorable evidence and information most
effectively the sooner it is received, the opinion finds that disclosure is
required "as soon as reasonably practical" once it is known to the
prosecutor. 42
The ABA Committee also examined how and when defense
counsel may use favorable evidence and information, such as in
conducting a defense investigation, deciding whether to raise a defense,
determining trial strategy in general, and in advising the defendant
whether to plead guilty." Thus, "[tjhe obligation of timely disclosure of
favorable evidence and information requires disclosure to be made
36. Formal Op., supra note 9, at 4.
37. rd. all, 5,
38. MODEL RULESOFPROF'L Counuct R 3.8(d) (2007) (emphasis added).
39. Formal Op., supra note 9, at 5.
40. MODELRULESOF PROF'L CONDUCTR 3.8(d).
41. Formal Op., Supra note 9, at 6.
42, ld.
43, ld.
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sufficiently in advance of these and similar actions and decisions that the
defense can effectively use the evidence and information.'?"
The ABA Committee specifically addressed the critical issue of
whether prosecutotial disclosure requirements apply in the context of a
guilty plea." Emphasizing how important defense counsel's evaluation
of the strength of the prosecutor's case is to a defendant considering
whether to plead guilty, the opinion states that timely disclosure under
Rule 3.8(d) requires disclosure of evidence and information "prior to a
guilty plea proceeding, which may occur concurrently with the
defendant's arraignment.":" The interpretation of Rule 3.8(d) to require
disclosure prior to a guilty plea contrasts sharply with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Brady rule in United States v. Ruiz."
d. Waiver
Another important issue regarding prosecutorial disclosure in the
guilty plea context is waiver. Opinion 09-454 makes clear that a
defendant may not waive or consent to the prosecutor's abrogation of the
ethical disclosure duty, and "a prosecutor may not solicit, accept or rely
on the defendant's consent" as a mechanism to avoid Rule 3.8(d)48 The
opinion notes that a third party may not absolve a lawyer of an ethical
duty except in specifically authorized instances, such as consent to
certain conflicts of interest." Unlike ethics rules such as Model Rule
1.6, dealing with confidentiality, so and Model Rule 1.7, dealing with
conflicts of interest;" Rule 3.8( d) does not explicitly permit third party
consent to exempt a prosecutor from fulfilling Rule 3.8(d)'s disclosure
bli , 52o iganon.
The opinion states that Rule 3.8(d) is designed both to protect the
defendant and "to promote the public's interest in the fairness and
reliability of the criminal justice system, which requires that defendants
be able to make informed decisions.v" Allowing the prosecutor to
obtain a defendant's waiver of disclosure of favorable evidence and
information undermines defense counsel's ability to advise the defendant
44, Id,
45. ta.
46. Id.
47. 536 u.s. 622. 629-30. 633 (2002).
48. Formal Op., supra note 9, at 7.
49. Id. at 7.
50. MODEL RULESOF PROP'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009).
51. ld. R. 1.7,
52. See id. R, ],8(d).
53. Formal Op., supra note 9, at 7.
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whether to plead guilty and may lead a factually innocent defendant to
plead guilty.54
In Ruiz, the Supreme Court held that a plea agreement could require
a defendant to waive the right to receive Brady material that could be
used to impeach critical witnesses.55 Nonetheless, the ethics opinion
states that even if the courts were to hold that a defendant could entirely
waive the right to favorable evidence for constitutional purposes, "the
ethical obligations established by Rule 3.8(d) are not coextensive with
the prosecutor's constitutional duties of disclosure.v'"
e. Supervisory Responsibility
Supervisory lawyers in a prosecutor's office are obligated to ensure
that subordinate lawyers comply with Rule 3.8(d)57 This obligation
requires the supervisory lawyer who directly oversees a trial prosecutor
to ensure that the trial prosecutor meets his or her ethical disclosure
obligation." A supervisory lawyer is "subject to discipline for ordering,
ratifying or knowingly failing to correct discovery violations."" The
opinion advises such managerial lawyers to promote compliance with
Rule 3.8(d) by adequately training subordinate lawyers and by having
internal office procedures that facilitate compliance.60
The opinion discusses a case in which work is distributed among
several different prosecutors." In such a situation, the opinion advises
that there should be an internal policy requiring all prosecutors on the
case to convey all files containing favorable evidence or information to
the prosecutor responsible for discovery" Another useful internal
policy would require that favorable information conveyed orally to a
prosecutor be memorialized in writing." The opinion also recommends
requiring a prosecutor who obtains information favorable to a defendant
in another case to provide it to the colleague responsible for the other
case."
54. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in (he Guilty Plea Process, 40
HASTINGSLJ. 957, 991-92 (l989); Kevin C. McMuoigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and
Wrongful Convictions, 57 CASE.W. RES. L. REv. 651, 658-61 (2007).
55. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629-30 (2002).
56. Formal Op., supra note 9, at 7. n.33.
57. [d. at 8.
58. t«
59. /d.
60. Id.
61. ld.
62. ld.
63. ld.
64. ld.
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f. Sentencing
The duty to disclose to the defense and the tribunal "in connection
with sentencing" all unprivileged mitigating information known to the
prosecutor differs from the disclosure obligation that applies before a
guilty plea or trial in four ways. First, the information differs because the
duty requires disclosure of mitigating information that might lead to a
more lenient sentence, such as a defendant having a lower level of
involvement in a crime than a co-defendant." Second, the prosecutor
must make the disclosure to the tribunal as well as to the defendant66
Third, information that would only mitigate a sentence need not be
disclosed prior to a trial but only after a guilty plea or verdict." Fourth,
Rule 3.8(d) permits the prosecutor to withhold privileged mitigating
information in connection with a sentencing."
2. In re Field
A recent California opinion, In re Fie/d,6' provides an example of
state ethics authorities taking prosecutorial disclosure failures seriously"
and is another encouraging sign of change in enforcement attitudes. The
California state bar sought discipline of a career prosecutor for a variety
of ethical violations in four different cases over a ten year period." Two
of the four cases involved disclosure failures."
One of the disclosure failures occurred in a habeas corpus case
brought by two prisoners seeking review of their sexual assault
convictions." The habeas petitioners knew of a witness to whom the
fifteen-year-old victim had made a statement inconsistent with her trial
testimony-that "she made up the sexual assault allegations to avoid
punishment for missing curfew."?' But the petitioners did not know the
present location of this key witness." An investigator working with the
65. Id. at 7.
66. ta.
67. Jd. at 7-8.
68. /d. at 8.
69. No. 05-0-00815; 06-0-12344 (Cal. State Bar 2010).
70. td. at 1.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 3. The other violations involved improper closing argument and violating various
court orders. ld.
73. Id. at 3, 6.
74. {d. at 6.
75. Jd.
-- -----
R55
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prosecutor used telephone records to locate and interview the witness. 76
During the interview, the investigator obtained a tape recorded statement
from the witness confirming the victim's statement that she had "made
up" the allegations."
But the prosecutor failed to reveal the location of the witness, the
interview, or the recorded statement.78 Instead, he actively concealed the
information about the witness by filing a misleading status conference
statement in which he implied that the witness had not been found.'9 He
also instructed his investigator to file a declaration that excluded the fact
that he had found and interviewed the witness." The prosecutor revealed
the information only after the defense had independently located the
witness and learned that the prosecution's investigator had previously
found and interviewed him."
Oddly enough, California has no ethical equivalent of Model Rule
3.8(d).82 Instead of finding that the prosecutor had violated an ethical
disclosure duty, the Field court found that the prosecutor had violated a
California ethics provision stating that "any act involving moral
turpitude, dishonesty or corruption ... constitutes a cause for disbarment
or suspension.?" The court concluded that the prosecutor's conduct
regarding the location of, and interview with, the impeachment witness
constituted an act of moral turpitude because it reflected dishonesty. 84
The second charge in the Field case involving failure to disclose
arose in a robbery and murder trial. 85 The prosecutor failed to reveal
impeachment evidence regarding bias of a key state witness-that the
witness was an accomplice to the charged robbery rather than a mere
bystander.86 Again the prosecutor failed to reveal this impeachment
evidence until the defense discovered it independently a week before the
trial.87 In regard to this disclosure failure, the Field court focused on the
statutory discovery obligations of the prosecutor" and found that
76. Id. at 6-7.
77. Id. at 7.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Jd. at 8.
82. Niki Kuckes, The State oIRule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Reform Since Ethics 2000, 22
GEO. J. LEGALETHICS463, 482-83 (2009).
83. CAL. Bus. & PROF. § 6016 (West 2003); In re Field, 05-0-00815; 06-0-12344, at 9-11.
84. Id. at 10.
85. ld. at 14-[6.
86. Id. at 15-16.
87. ld. at 16.
88. The court found statutory violations of California Penal Code Section l054.1 (b) and (f).
ld. at 16-17.
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because the prosecutor failed to meet these statutory obligations, he had
violated his ethical duty "[t]o support the ... laws ... of this state.?"
The most promising aspect of the Field case, in my view, is that
those involved in the disciplinary process in Field all appear to have
taken the disclosure violations seriously. Unlike a recent Louisiana case,
discussed in Section II(B)(2) below;"? state bar counsel who prosecuted
the case, the hearing judge, and the three judges of the review court
showed no ambivalence and little disagreement regarding either the
violations or the appropriate sanction." State bar counsel sought a three
year suspension but both the hearing judge and the review court
recommended a four year suspension," a significant sanction.
In regard to the first of the disclosure charges, the prosecutor in
Field argued that disclosure of exculpatory information is not required in
a habeas corpus proceeding." Another significant aspect of Field is the
fact that the California ethics authorities rejected this argument and
found that the prosecutor's failure to reveal the exculpatory information
in the context of a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding did violate
his ethical obligations." In fmding a post-conviction disclosure
obligation, the California authorities aligned themselves with the ABA's
current position, set forth in Model Rule 3.8(e)95
Also encouraging in Field is that the California ethics authorities
did not allow the fact that the defense independently discovered the
exculpatory evidence to insulate the prosecutor from ethical liability.
3. Other cases
In the last two decades, disciplinary authorities in a number of
states have shown a willingness to enforce their equivalents to Model
Rule 3.8(d). In a number of published cases, ethics authorities sought
and obtained sanctions against prosecutors for disclosure violations"
89. CAL. Bus. & PROF, § 6068(a) (West 2003); In re Field, 05-0-00815; 06-0-12344, at 17.
90. See infra notes 142-63.
91. In re Field, 05-0-00815; 06-0-12344, at 27-28.
92. td. at 28. The prosecutor disciplined in Field may appeal the Review Court's findings and
recommendation to the California Supreme Court. CAL. R. OF Cr. 9.16(a), available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/documents!pdtFilesititle_9.pdf.
93. Id. at 8-9.
94. /d. at 9.
95. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 3.8(e) (2007) ("The prosecutor in a criminal case
shall (c) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence
about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes: (I) the information sought is
not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege; (2) the evidence sought is essential to the
successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and (3) there is no other feasible
alternative to obtain the information,").
96. See, e.g., In re Jordan, 91 P.3d 1168, 1173, 1175 (Kan. 2004) (public censure); In re
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The most famous such case, and the one imposing the most severe
sanction, is the North Carolina bar's disbarment of Michael Nifong,
mentioned above."
Like the Field case, a number of these cases show encouraging
signs about ethical enforcement. In several, ethics authorities sought and
obtained serious sanctions. Michael Nifong was disbarred." The
California ethics court recommended a four-year suspension for
Benjamin Field.99 In Committee on Professional Ethics v. Ramey,IOO the
Iowa Supreme Court imposed an indefinite license suspension;'?' and in
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Jones.t" the Ohio Supreme Court
imposed a six-month suspension.'?' It should be kept in mind that
typically, these cases involve charges of other ethical violations in
addition to charges of disclosure failures and that factors such as the
prosecutor's prior record of ethical violations, or lack thereof, have an
. I . 10.Impact on t te sanction.
Some of these cases show willingness to enforce the prosecutor's
ethical disclosure obligations in the context of a guilty plea, as recent
ABA Opinion 09-454 states is appropriate. lOS For example, the South
Carolina Supreme Court disciplined a prosecutor for a Model Rule
3.8(d) violation for failing to reveal key impeachment evidence
regarding an important witness for the state despite the fact that the
defendant had pled guilty. 106
A Kansas case, In re Carpenter.i'" shows a state supreme court
willing to use an aggressive----and, I think, controversial-reading of its
ethics code to discipline a prosecutor who failed to reveal key
Grant, 541 S.E.2d 540, 540 (S.c. 2001) (public reprimand by consent); Comm. on Prof'! Ethics v,
Ramey, 512 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Iowa 1994) (indefinite suspension with no possibility of
reinstatement for three months); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Jones, 613 N.E.2d 178, 180
(Ohio 1993) (six-month suspension); In re Carpenter, 808 P.2d 1341,1346 (Kan. [991) (public
censure); State Bar v, Hoke & Graves, No. 04-DHC 15, at 668-69, 671 (N.c. State Bar 2004)
(public reprimand),
97. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
98. Wilson, supra note 2, at A21.
99. In re Field, 05-0-00815; 06-0~12344, at 28.
100. 512 N,W.2d 569.
101. Id. at 572.
102. 613 N.E.2d 178.
103. Mat180.
104. See, e.g., Ramey, 512 N.W.2d at 572; Jones, 613 N.E.2d at 179; In re Field, 05-0-00815;
06-0-12344, at I.
105. Formal Op., supra note 9, at 6; see, e.g., Ramey, 512 N,W.2d at 572; Jones, 613 N.E.2d at
179; In re Field, 05-0-00815; 06-0-12344, at 1.
106. See 11/re Grant, 542 S.E.2d 540, 540 (S,C. 200 I).
107. 808 P.2d 1341, 1345-46 (Kan. 2001).
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exculpatory evidence in a rape case.108 The defendant in the case, an
employee at a nursing horne, was charged with having raped a mentally
and physically disabled resident of the nursing horne. 109 Just prior to the
trial, the complainant, her mother, and her social worker told the
prosecutor that the complainant had contracted gonorrhea during the
rapes. 110 The prosecutor advanced this claim at trial, cross-examined the
defendant about it when he testified, and brought it up at the time of
sentencing. III During the trial, the prosecutor asked an employee of the
district attorney's office to contact the local hospital to corroborate that
the complainant contracted gonorrhea. II' The hospital told the employee
that tests of the complainant for gonorrhea had corne back negative and
thus she had never been diagnosed with or treated for gonorrhea."!'
Despite the fact that the prosecutor had requested this information, she
claimed never to have been informed about the hospital's response to her
request until the defendant filed a new trial motion.'!"
lt was clear then that the prosecutor's office did know, and that the
individual prosecutor should have known, about the exculpatory
evidcnce.!" But Model Rule 3.8(d) requires that a prosecutor herself
know about exculpatory evidence or information in order to be found in
violation of the rule. 116 And DR 7-103(8), the Model Code precursor to
Model Rule 3.8( d) in force at the time in Kansas, also required
knowledge on the part of the prosecutor. 117 To avoid having to resolve
the issue of the prosecutor's knowledge, the Kansas Supreme Court did
not rely on DR 7-1 03(B) to discipline the prosecutor, 118 even though that
rule bore most directly on disclosure of exculpatory evidence. Instead, it
disciplined her for violating two other and more general rules for failing
to seek out and learn of the exculpatory evidence. The court found that
she engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice 119 and
conduct that adversely reflected on her fitness to practice law. 120
108. Jd. at 1345-46.
109. t« at 1342.
110. fd.
Ill. Id. at 1343-44.
112. Jd. at 1342.
113. fd.
114. fd.
115. Id.
116. MODEL RULESOF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2007).
117. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBTUTY DR 7-103(8) (1980).
Its. See In re Carpenter, 808 P.2d at 1346 (finding the prosecutor in violation of DR t ,
102(A)(S) and (6)).
119. See MODEL CODE OFPROF'L RESPONSIBIUTY DR 1~I02 (A)(5).
120. See id. DR 1-102 (A)(6).
860 HOFSTRA LA W REVfEW [Vol. 38:847
B. Signs of Continuing Resistance
Published cases in the last two decades also offer evidence of
continuing resistance to enforcement of prosecutors' ethical disclosure
duties.
I. Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin
A recent Ohio Supreme Court case, Disciplinary Counsel v.
Kellogg-Martin, 121 makes clear that it is a mistake to overstate the
significance of ABA Opinion 09-454 in assessing whether enforcement
attitudes regarding prosecutor disclosure are changing. The prosecutor
charged a defendant with multiple counts based on his having had sexual
intercourse with a minor. 122 The most serious of these charges, carrying
a potential life sentence, alleged that the victim was under thirteen at the
time of the intercourse and that the defendant used force.123 The
disclosure issues giving rise to the disciplinary charges dealt with
infonmation relating to the victim's age at the time of the offense and the
use of force. 124 In speaking with a social worker, the complainant gave
inconsistent statements about the dates on which the intercourse took
place, some indicating that she was twelve at the time, others indicating
that she was thirteen.J" In speaking with a detective, the victim stated
that she did not resist either verbally or physically. 126 The prosecutor did
not tum over to the defendant prior to him pleading guilty written
reports containing the victim's prior statements implying that she was
thirteen at the time and saying that that she did not resist. 127 Both her age
and the use of force were key factors in detenmining the gravity of the
offense and the defendant's potential sentence. 128
Ohio's disciplinary counsel filed charges against the prosecutor and
both a panel of Ohio's Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline and the entire Board sustained the charges, with the Board
recommending a one year suspension with six months stayed.!" With
only one justice dissenting, however, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed
and found that no ethical violation had occurred.':" In doing so, it
121. 923 N.E2d 125, 127 (Oh;o2010).
\22. fd. a1127, 130.
123. Id. at 133.
124. /d. at 133~34.
125. Id. at 128.
126. Id. at 130.
l27. /d. at 129.
128. Id. at 133.
129. Id. at 127.
130. Id. at 127, 133.
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reached a nwnber of conclusions diametrically opposed to ABA Opinion
09-454.
First, the court found that the prosecutor's ethical disclosure duty is
not broader than, but rather co-extensive with, the constitutional duty
imposed by Brady. III Second, the court found that Brady does not
require disclosure of exculpatory impeachment material prior to a guilty
plea,132 citing the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in United States v.
Ruiz.133 Since the prosecutor's ethical disclosure duty, in the court's
view, mirrors the prosecutor's constitutional disclosure duty, the court
found that the ethical duty also does not require disclosure of
exculpatory impeachment material prior to a guilty plea. l34 The Court
explained that this conclusion flows from the waiver of Brady rights that
a defendant "necessarily makes by pleading guilty." 135 The court found
that a guilty plea constitutes an implicit waiver of the constitutional right
to disclosure and thus, also waiver of the prosecutor's ethical duty of
disclosure. 136
Each of these key points in the Ohio Supreme Court's analysis in
Kellogg-Martin-that the ethical duty is not broader in scope than the
constitutional duty, that disclosure is not required prior to a guilty plea,
and that a defendant can waive a prosecutor's ethical mandate-are at
odds with ABA Opinion 09-454. The Kellogg-Martin opinion is also
seemingly inconsistent with a 2003 Ohio Supreme Court Opinion,
Disciplinary Counsel v. Wrenn.137 Like Kellogg-Martin, Wrenn dealt
with a prosecution of charges of sexual misconduct with a minor. 138
Prior to the defendant's guilty plea, the prosecutor failed to disclose
results of DNA testing that, while not entirely exculpatory, prompted a
significant change in the victim's account of the crime.IJ9 That change,
like the discrepancies in the victim's statements in Kellogg-Martin,
would have had significant impeachment value for the defense at trial. 140
Unlike in Kellogg-Martin, though, where the court used the contours of
the Brady rule to determine the contours of the ethical disclosure duty,
the Wrenn court neither mentioned nor cited Brady or any of its
131. 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963); Kellogg-Martin, 923 N.E.2d at 130.
132. Kellogg-Martin, 923 N.E.2d at l30.
lJ3. 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002).
134. Kellogg-Manin, 923 N.E.2d at 131.
135. id.
136. id
137. 790 N.E.2d 1'195, 1198 (2003).
lJ8. fd. at 1195.
139. id at 1196.
140. Id. at 1197-98; see Kellogg-Martin, 923 N.E.2d at 130.
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progeny."! And despite the fact that the defendant pled guilty, the court
nonetheless found that the prosecutor had violated his ethical disclosure
d t 142U y.
The Kellogg-Martin court failed either explicitly to overrule Wrenn
or reconcile it with the Kellogg-Martin opinion.'? Indeed, the Kellogg-
Martin opinion does not even mention or cite Wrenn. 144 In addition, the
Kellogg-Martin court neither cited nor otherwise acknowledged recent
ABA Opinion 09-454,145the most important ABA pronouncement on
the contours of the prosecutorial ethical obligation at issue in the case.
2. In re Jordan
A 2005 Louisiana Supreme Court case, In re Jordan, 146 exemplifies
the contradictory attitudes one finds in recent cases about ethics
enforcement and sanctions regarding prosecutorial disclosure failures.
The prosecutor in a capital murder case, State v. Cousin.i" failed to
turn over to the defense prior statements by the state's primary witness
that the Louisiana Supreme Court later found "obviously"
exculpatory.!" That court overturned the conviction on other grounds,
but stated in several footnotes that the statements should have been
produced under Brady and Kyles v. Whitley.l49 Seven years later, a
disciplinary case against the prosecutor in the case arising from his
failure to disclose in the Cousin case, and based on Louisiana's version
of Model Rule 3.8(d), came before the same court."? The Louisiana
Supreme Court found that the prosecutor had violated Rule 3.8(d) and
imposed a three-month suspension with the entire suspension deferred
subject to the prosecutor committing no further misconduct for a period
of one year. 151
One might view the substantive portions of the Louisiana Supreme
Court opinions in Cousin and Jordan together as a very positive sign. In
the first opinion, the court spotted a Brady violarlon.!" In the second
opinion, the court imposed ethical discipline on the prosecutor based on
141. See Wrenn, 790N.E.2dat 1196-97.
142. Id. at 1198.
143. See Kellogg-Martin, 923 N.E.2d at 130-32.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. 913 So. 2d 775 (La. 2005).
147. 710So.2d 1065(La 1998).
148. ta. at 1066-67 & n.2.
149. ld. at 1066 & nn.2 & 8.
150. In re Jordan, 913 So. 2d at 777.
lSI Id. at 782, 784.
152. Cousin, 710 So. 2d at 1066 & n.2.
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the conduct that violated Brady.153 This is what prosecutorial critics
have long argued that courts should be doing.
But on closer examination, Jordan reveals several troubling
aspects. Though the case undeniably shows ethics charges being brought
against a prosecutor and a court willing to find a prosecutor liable for
violating an ethics disclosure rule, imposition took seven years and the
sanction-a three-month deferred suspension I54-seems relatively mild
for a disclosure violation in a capital murder case.
Also troubling is the Jordan court's acknowledgement that "[t]his
is a case of first impression in the State of Louisiana. Never before have
we been confronted with the issue of disciplining a prosecutor for failing
to disclose" under Rule 3.8(d).I55 This acknowledgement by the court
reinforces the widely held view that Rule 3.8(d) and its predecessor have
rarely been enforced.
Another troubling aspect of the Jordan opinion is the divergence of
views it reveals among the various actors involved in the disciplinary
process, and the reluctance of many of those actors to discipline the
prosecutor. The Jordan case provides a detailed history of the
disciplinary proceedings, which began in 1998 when the defendant in the
Cousin case and his sister filed a complaint with the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC,,).156 The prosecutor argued that the
statement at issue had both incriminatory and exculpatory aspects and
that he believed that it "was more inculpatory than exculpatory" and thus
exempt from disclosure."? Despite the fact that the Louisiana Supreme
Court had characterized the prior statements as obviously exculpatory
and had stated that they should have been disclosed, after investigation,
the ODC dismissed the complaint. 158 On appeal, a hearing committee
supported the ODC dismissal. 159Later, the disciplinary board remanded
the matter to the ODC with instructions to file formal charges.!'" A
majority of the hearing committee found that the ODC had not proven a
Rule 3.8(d) violation while a dissenting member voted in favor of
finding a violation. 161 The disciplinary board disagreed with the hearing
committee, finding that the prosecutor had "technically violated" Rule
153. In re Jordan, 913 So. Zd at 782.
154. [d. at 779, 784 (complaint filed against respondent in May 1998 was not resolved until
2005).
155. t« at 781.
156. fd. at 777~81.
157 Id. at 779.
158. ld.
159. Jd.
160. Jd.
161. Id at 780.
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3.8(d).'62 But it concluded that no discipline was appropriate and
dismissed the charges.l'" The ODC sought review in the Louisiana
Supreme Court, which, consistent with its treatment of the issue in 1998,
found that the prosecutor had violated Rule 3.8(d) and imposed a three
. 164month deferred suspension.
At best, this schizophrenic disciplinary saga suggests amhivalence
about disciplining the prosecutor on the part of the participants in the
disciplinary process in the Jordan case, other than the justices of
Supreme Court. At worst, it reflects active resistance to such
enforcement. Prior to commencement of the disciplinary process, the
Louisiana Supreme Court stated that the prosecutor had been
constitutionally compelled to turn over the statement at issue.l'" The
language of Model Rule 3.8(d) clearly creates a more expansive
disclosure obligation than the constitutional duty created by Brady. At
the end of the proceedings, the court found that the prosecutor violated
Rule 3.8(d).166 Nonetheless, between these consistent rulings, the ODC
had to be compelled to file charges and a majority on the hearing
committee voted twice against discipline.I'" The disciplinary board,
though mandating the filing of charges, ultimately found that no
discipline was appropriate. 168 Thus, though the court ultimately found a
violation and imposed a sanction, the fact that the court had never had
occasion either to interpret or enforce Rule 3.8(d) prior to Jordan, and
the pervasive reluctance to sanction the prosecutor displayed by the
various participants in the disciplinary process does not bode well for a
change in enforcement attitudes.
III. CONCLUSION
Recent developments regarding disciplinary enforcement of
prosecutorial disclosure rules reveal a good deal of contradictory
evidence. In short, one can find both good news and bad news.
First the bad news. The number of recent high-profile cases
revealing disclosure violations by experienced prosecutors, several of
which I mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this essay, suggest that
serious and consistent disciplinary enforcement has yet to be achieved or
viewed as a significant threat by many prosecutors. These cases also
162. {d.
163. {d. at 780-81.
164. Id. at 784.
165. ld. at 782.
166. !d.
167. Id. a1780.
t 68. Id.
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suggest that disclosure failures are not simply a product of inexperience,
inattention, or lack ofresources on the part of prosecutors working at the
margin. Another piece of bad news, as I mentioned previously, is the
troubling evidence one finds in cases such as Kellogg-Martin and In re
Jordan of continued resistance by state supreme courts and ethics
authorities to enforcing disclosure rules that have long been in existence
and long been ignored.
What, then, is the good news? The most obviously encouraging
developments have been the attention recently given to the issue by the
ABA in Formal Opinion 09-454 and the change in attitude on the part of
some state ethics authorities and courts, evidenced in cases such as In re
Field. I also see as good news the criticism and publicity cases, such as
the prosecution of Ted Stevens, have drawn. The criticism indicates that
many in the press and public view prosecutorial disclosure failures as
unacceptable. This criticism along with the publicity these cases have
generated will hopefully place the issue of prosecutorial disclosure on
the national radar screen and pressure state ethics authorities to increase
enforcement and prosecutors offices to adopt internal measures to reduce
violations.
